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ARTICLES
(Im)material culture: towards an archaeology of cybercrime
Clive Harfielda and John Schofieldb
aInstitute of Cyber Investigations and Forensics, University of the Sunshine Coast, Sippy Downs, Australia; bDepartment 
of Archaeology, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Cybercrime is ubiquitous. People now inhabit a digital environment compris-
ing permanent risk, exponential threats, and multiple virtual/physical harms, 
forming a global community of malefactors and the criminally exploited. The 
purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, through an archaeological lens, to 
characterize the new materiality of cybercrime (including its artefacts and 
architecture alongside digital/virtual manifestations). And second, to explore 
the potential for new perspectives on cybercrime borne out of this archae-
ological approach. In short: what is the archaeology of cybercrime and can new 
understandings emerge from an archaeological perspective? In undertaking 
this research we also challenge the long-held presumption that non-physical 




new materiality; digital 
environment
Introduction
Traditionally, archaeology has sought to understand past human behaviours through the excavation of 
their material traces, taking account of those factors that transform the archaeological record between 
the point of deposition and discovery (e.g. Schiffer 1976). A very different archaeological approach 
however applies to more recent periods where a profusion in material culture exists alongside infinite 
other potential sources of evidence while, for the contemporary world at least, most if not all material 
traces exist on the surface (Harrison and Schofield 2010; Harrison 2011). A further and particular challenge 
exists in relation to what has been termed the ‘new materiality’ (DeLanda 2015; Minahan and Wolfram 
Cox 2007), where traces are largely if not entirely virtual, digital, fluid and intangible. Contemporary 
society is increasingly characterized by this new materiality and its almost infinite abundance.
In this paper we take an interdisciplinary approach to cybercrime, a particular example of this new 
materiality and one that is likely to affect everybody in society. Through our respective backgrounds in 
cybersecurity and contemporary archaeology, we first define and then outline what we consider to be the 
archaeology of cybercrime (comprising its ‘trace’ although only rarely will this be physical). We then 
explore the possibility of using archaeology to develop helpful new perspectives on cybercrime as 
a contribution to what we refer to as the philosophy of cybersecurity, being an adaptive approach to 
the hazards of living in the digital environment. We contend that an archaeological perspective provides 
unique insight on cybercrime through rendering visible or concrete what for many is invisible or abstract, 
and creating order and structure out of a highly complex virtual landscape. The paper also aligns with 
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current thinking around heritage, with its increased focus on the intangible elements of culture and 
society, on the digital archive and on the future (Harrison et al. 2020).
Over three centuries, archaeological methodologies have developed which promote the under-
standing of complex landscapes shaped by human interventions often over millennia. Here we 
extend that archaeological approach to a complex virtual landscape, questioning whether the same 
archaeological perspective might contribute to cybersecurity, comprising the countermeasures 
constantly being developed to mitigate and prevent cybercrime. The study forms part of 
a growing number of projects that demonstrate the validity and relevance of archaeology in 
addressing complex, multi-causal global challenges highly resistant to resolution, sometimes 
referred to as ‘wicked problems’ (APSC 2018) for which simple single-discipline solutions are unlikely 
to succeed. Other examples of archaeological approaches to wicked problems include marine 
plastic pollution (Schofield et al. 2020) and social inequality (Kiddey 2017).
Archaeologies of the contemporary past (conveniently referred to here as ‘contemporary archae-
ology’) emerged as part of the processual/new archaeology of the 1960s, with its philosophy of 
logical positivism: learning about the past through observed behaviours in the present, not least 
through use of ethnoarchaeology. Of various ethnoarchaeological encounters, Rathje’s Garbage 
Project (e.g. Rathje and Murphy 2001; Rathje et al. 1992) stands out for its emphasis on under-
standing the present through the application of archaeological methods. This project exerted 
significant influence on a second wave of contemporary archaeology projects and publications in 
the early 21st century (summarized in Harrison and Schofield 2010), now with a clear emphasis on 
archaeology as contemporary practice and the archaeology of the contemporary world.
Two aspects of this contemporary archaeology have particular relevance here: the use of 
archaeology in conventional forensic investigations; and the application of archaeological methods 
and perspectives to the digital environment. The first of these is widely known. Examples and 
outcomes of archaeological work in criminal investigations regularly appear in archaeological (e.g. 
Crossland 2013) and criminological and forensic scientific literature (e.g. Schultz and Dupraz 2008). It 
is also widely known by virtue of its exposure in popular crime drama.
The second aspect comprises archaeological contributions to understanding the digital environ-
ment. Examples include Moshenska’s (2014) excavation and investigation of a memory stick, Perry 
and Morgan’s (2015) excavation of a hard-drive, Beale, Schofield, and Austin’s (2018) study of the 
computer mouse and Cocroft and Schofield’s (2019) archaeological investigation of the Cold War 
signals and intelligence gathering site of Teufelsberg in Berlin. A further and important area of study 
within this context is video gaming (e.g. Reinhard 2015; Aycock, Reinhard, and Therrien 2019). 
Together these contributions represent an emerging field that demonstrates the diversity of ways 
archaeological approaches can enhance understanding of a fast-changing digital world and peo-
ple’s interactions with it.
This paper builds on these various archaeological foundations, merging them with ideas and 
knowledge from the field of cybersecurity to construct an argument that there is an archaeology of 
cybercrime which can helpfully contribute to addressing the wicked problem that it presents for 
society. Before outlining this archaeology of cybercrime we consider, briefly, what defines cyber-
crime and what are its consequences, for people and for society.
Cybercrime – definitions and consequences
We define cybercrime broadly: not merely criminal deviance that exists solely in, and only because 
of, the characteristics of the connected and cellular digital environment (cybercrime proper) – 
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automated malware corrupting operating systems, for instance – but also digitized conduct that 
constitutes criminal deviance in non-digital environments; for example: blackmail reconfigured as 
ransomware; and unlawful acquisition of electronic funds or digitized intellectual property through 
theft or deception (‘ordinary’ crimes committed using a digital device). Thus an internet- or wifi- 
enabled digital device may be separately or simultaneously: a perpetration tool, a crime scene, and 
a non-biological crime-target.
Within this context, the connected digital environment parallels the physical environment. Humans 
co-exist in each, to different degrees by generation (Floridi 2013, 14–15; Holt, Bossler, and Seigfried- 
Spellar 2018, 4–5) while existence in the digital environment is triggering both psychological and 
physiological changes in humans (Greenfield 2015; Bhatt 2019). In terms of behaviours, digital connec-
tivity exponentially increases the potential scope and range of deviance. Acting alone, whether at home, 
in a cyber-café or on a park bench, an individual can commit multiple automated crimes anywhere in the 
connected world (disguising their location as they do so) for as long as their digital device is powered. For 
those who lack the competence or sangfroid to perpetrate cybercrime themselves, ‘Cybercrime as 
a Service’ (CaaS) is available (Manky 2013; Europol 2020). The demographic profile of agents in the 
archaeology of cybercrime thus includes: humans; digital devices programmed to operate automatically 
within the limits of their programming; and artificial intelligence devices capable of self-enhancement 
and initiating actions beyond their original programming (see Goodman 2016). All of this is changing the 
character of actors, agency, and arenas in the understanding of cybercrime as a ubiquitous activity.
Cybercrime harm is multidimensional (Agrafiotis et al. 2018) and can be divided into five distinct 
categories:
(1) Physical harms in the form of compromised hardware, and damage caused by corrupted 
systems operation (Jenkins 2013; Zetter 2014); and the damage and injury arising from the 
criminal use of digital technology (for example, hacking driverless cars and causing crashes, 
Carter 2019).
(2) Virtual harms comprising compromised networks; corrupted software; crimes committed in 
virtual reality worlds (Goodman 2010); physical identification documents devalued through 
data breaches; and privacy intrusion from antisocial use of social media (Fogel and Nehmad 
2009).
(3) Community and individual social harms such as the erosion of trust (Bhatt 2019), con-
nected to the psychological damage to self-confidence through victimization; the feelings 
of violation, increased risk and decreased safety incurred through online identity usurpa-
tion (Goldsmid, Gannoni, and Smith 2018); and personal psychological and reputational 
injury (sometimes triggering victim self-harm or self-destruction) from trolling and cyber- 
bullying (Ballard and Welch 2015), online domestic violence (Douglas, Harris, and 
Dradiewicz 2019), and malicious online postings such as revenge porn (Henry and Powell 
2015).
(4) Economic harms, including losses incurred falling victim to fraud, or the costs of repairing the 
damages of the harms itemized above (Smith 2018).
(5) Consequential harms, when non-digital crimes such as illicit commodity trafficking and 
service provision are facilitated by digital technology (Bartlett 2015), in turn sustaining 
individual and social ills such as narcotic addiction (Barratt, Ferris, and Winstock 2013), or 
the online exploitation of children (Carr 2010).
WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 609
Digital technology exists at and cohabits the intersection of the physical and the digital environ-
ments. People explore potential within the digital environment every day, seemingly motivated as 
much by criminal intent as by beneficence (Schneier 2000; Bartlett 2015). The digital environment 
exposes more individuals to more threats and harms than they are likely to encounter in the physical 
environment and safety and survival necessitate adaptation founded on comprehension. Parallels 
exist here with past societies where people did not understand the risk of other types of contamina-
tion, for example from industrial processes, disease or water. Then, as now, people learnt from 
experience, and had to learn and adapt to survive. This paper takes the position that archaeology 
and cybercriminology could complement and supplement one another, not least in the analysis of 
digital environment artefacts, to help improve that comprehension. We return to this prospect in the 
conclusion. It is to the new materiality of cybercrime that we now turn.
The new materiality of cybercrime
A typology of cybercrime logically distinguishes physical tools from the digital (while recognizing 
also how the two might overlap). The physical tools – those that enable human engagement with 
the digital environment – may be classified under four headings:
(1) Input and interaction devices such as keyboards, mice, monitors, hand-held devices (e.g. 
tablets, phones, cameras) and home assistance devices (e.g. Google Home, Alexa).
(2) Storage devices (e.g. hard drives, USB thumb drives, memory cards), together with any 
associated peripheral devices necessary to connect a storage device to the third class,
(3) processing devices (central processing units; servers; laptops; tablets).
(4) Internet access infrastructure tools (cabling, routers, wireless access points, mobile broad-
band devices, wi-fi and telecommunication relay towers and their associated microwave 
delivery systems, including orbiting communication satellites).
This already complex communications landscape is exponentially elaborated via the so-called 
‘Internet of Things’ [IoT]: innumerable interconnected household appliances, workplace devices, 
and vehicles operable from a tablet or smartphone or communicating data to other devices/ 
vehicles, which – because security is not often a feature of their functionality – are openly vulnerable 
to hacking and cybercrime utilization (Schneier 2018; Blythe, Sombatruang, and Johnson 2019). Of 
course, and crucially, all of these physical tools are designed and routinely used for entirely legal, 
routine and mundane tasks.
Digital artefacts of cybercrime are no less varied. These fall under three headings:
(1) Digital tools specifically developed to commit cybercrime. This includes malware, ransom-
ware, spyware, trojans, bots, viruses, spiders and hacking tools, all used to corrupt, compro-
mise, or acquire control of operating systems and stored data (Cisco Security 2018; Schneier 
2018).
(2) Legitimate digital tools adapted to commit cybercrime include key-loggers (Grebennikov 
2007: although usually a software program, a key-logger can also be a physical device, further 
complicating the cybercrime artefact catalogue) and Remote Administration Tools such as an 
IT service help-desk might use that also enable surreptitious activation of web-cams and 
microphones, either peripheral or inbuilt (McMillan 2013). The construction of a false digital 
identity to use in committing cybercrime online may be considered an artefact, whether it 
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remains only virtual or whether it includes the production of forged physical identification 
artefacts (using a 3D printer for instance).
(3) Digital artefacts that are the product of cybercrime include aggregated data-sets of personal 
identification information stolen or acquired through phishing, used criminally by the data- 
set creator or sold on in the CaaS market (Schneier 2000; Bartlett 2015); or the creation of 
a digividual (digital persona or avatar) for criminal ends (the experimental invention of Ronald 
Pinn proving how easy this is, O’Hagan 2017).
Online or connected content or data created for, and/or unlawfully acquired by, cybercrime activity – 
for example, a concocted narrative founding an advance fee fraud, or stolen intellectual property in 
digital form – represent two other sub-categories of digital artefact capable of being used in the 
interpretation, analysis and understanding of human conduct within the digital environment. 
Simultaneous classification in different categories is conceivable: data generated via fitness self- 
surveillance devices (digital devices that form part of the IoT), for example, is simultaneously cultural 
and behavioural data created for use by the artefact wearer (Lanzing 2016); digitized information 
that might subsequently be amenable to archaeological scrutiny (e.g. Perry and Morgan 2015); and 
data that can be hacked, misappropriated, and misused by cybercriminals.
Beyond the artefacts listed above, the architecture and physical infrastructure utilized in the 
commission of cybercrime comprises, for example: digital communication structures (towers and 
satellites supporting mobile phone and wi-fi transmitters for instance); and repurposed secure 
buildings offering physical separation of those committing cybercrime from the community 
(McKay 2019). At a mundane and domestic level, are the almost infinite number of buried digital 
service cables, for example connecting street furniture to dwellings.
In archaeological terms, the artefacts and virtual traces we describe form a typological framework 
that creates some order out of immense complexity. As a framework it also allows us to position the 
things we find (for example through criminal investigations) relative to one another, and forms 
a baseline for future research. Digital connectivity can redefine dimensions and here we might 
helpfully refer to two dimensions that are mainstays of archaeological enquiry: the spatial dimension 
(noting in particular how cybercrime, unusually, is placeless, or that ‘known’ fixed locations might be 
fake and deliberately deceptive); and a temporal dimension (in which cybercriminals are constantly 
trying to outwit cybersecurity, but in reality neither is fully aware of the other’s capabilities). In terms 
of place, Follis and Fish (2020, 29) explain how the, ‘absence of place has a leveling effect on the 
exercise of power. This fact allows solitary individuals or groups of hacktivists to act with impact on 
the international stage once reserved for nation-states.’ As an example of the temporal dimension, 
digital artefact creation is possible at rates inconceivable in the physical world: for example, 
December 2019 witnessed 16.61 million new malware programs; January 2020, 16.76 million; 
February 2020, 10.62 million (AVTest 2020).
Having summarized the new materiality of cybercrime and with this redefinition of two core 
dimensions of archaeological inquiry in mind, we now turn to whether an archaeological approach 
provides fresh insight to cybercrime. What can an archaeological approach tell us that we didn’t 
already know? First we discuss the generalities, before presenting a case study.
Archaeology and cybercrime
Archaeology has traditionally focused on the everyday and the ordinary, albeit as a contribution to 
wider cultural themes and questions. The archaeology of cybercrime is no exception. Indeed, this 
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may be its greatest advantage over other approaches and its most important contribution to the 
philosophy of cybersecurity, the wider themes in this case relating to technology and human 
adaptation. In this section we describe ways in which archaeology provides a distinctive and helpful 
framework for investigating cybercrime.
Hitherto, technology has characterized human interaction with the environment. Now tech-
nology is the environment. With cybercrime (and arguably for much of contemporary archae-
ology), a different relationship between people and technology prevails with implications both 
for the way people live and the way they should perceive their (digital) environment. While 
cybercrime is typically ‘placeless’, we argue that this aspect of the digital world complicates and 
adds new dimensions to the concept of ‘place’ in the sense of being simultaneously in real/ 
unreal places; or somewhere/nowhere/everywhere at the same time. Archaeological methodol-
ogies, adept at dealing with multiple conceptualizations of landscapes simultaneously, might be 
particularly well equipped to analyse and help to unravel these various entanglements.
Artefacts (including user-interface and data processing devices, digital products) illustrate the con-
nectivity that renders cybercrime and the opportunities to commit it or fall victim to it ubiquitous, 
camouflaged by being commonplace and creating global vulnerabilities. All day every day, the means to 
suffer harm through digital devices intended to benefit humankind surround the digitally-connected 
community. It is a landscape of threats and dangers. The seemingly innocuous and the easily overlooked 
create an environment of convenience simultaneously characterized by hostility and uncertainty, in 
which not only direct users but unwitting third parties can be seriously harmed. The Australian National 
University data breach in late 2018, discovered and reported in 2019 (ANU 2019), which exploited 
decommissioned but not yet disconnected legacy hardware, is a case in point. One of the authors of 
this paper (CH), at ANU between 2010 and 2013, will not know for certain whether he is a victim of that 
crime until and unless there is corroborating evidence that his ANU identity has been usurped and used 
for a further criminal purpose. We explore this case study in more detail below.
An individual simultaneously occupying the physical and digital environments is much more likely to 
fall victim to crime in the latter than in the former. In nearly six decades, the same author (CH) has not yet 
suffered a robbery or burglary, but in March 2020 (for example) was the target of two dozen phishing 
attacks. Adaptive behaviours to sustain safety and well-being in the physical environment are insufficient 
to achieve the same in the digital environment. In such a hostile environment, cybersecurity cannot be 
merely a series of tools, apps and software add-ons. Cybersecurity must be a way of life. And because the 
digital environment is artificial, the survival behaviours will not be naturally instinctive but must be 
intuitively learned, informed by a philosophy of cybersecurity, itself founded on new perspectives on 
cybercrime.
In contributing an archaeological perspective to the consideration of a philosophy of cyberse-
curity, we might helpfully review cybercrime within three related contextual frameworks, these 
being evidential, technical and social.
In the evidential context, cybercrime leaves traces amenable to both physical and digital forensic 
investigation: the ‘how’ and the ‘what with’ being means of identifying the ‘who’. For example, 
fingerprints, fibres, and DNA evidencing the physical presence of an individual at a location from 
which digital devices used in cybercrime have been recovered; paper documents linking individuals 
to digital records (Edwards 2020). For investigation managers, archaeological perspectives thus 
conceptually conjoin traditional physical scenes-of-crime examination with digital forensics, creat-
ing broader, more complex, strategic options (Shavers 2013).
In the technical context, digital stratigraphy and context relationships may offer new ways of under-
standing malware development, recognizing for example how systemic vulnerabilities come to be 
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embedded in software design processes. Before software is released on the market, such recognition 
could inform the ‘designing out’ of bugs that could be exploited criminally, a strategy consistent with the 
criminology concept of designing out crime (Ekblom 2005; Tilley 2005). Similarly, archaeological per-
spectives may produce insights into the evolution of innovative cybercrime methodologies that create 
new crime opportunities rather than exploit unintentional product vulnerabilities. Plotting past metho-
dological trajectories may offer a means of anticipating emerging and future methodologies with 
sufficient notice to develop and implement preventive intervention.
In the social context, archaeological frameworks provide a structure for representing the cybercrime 
environment to the global community of ICT-users, the majority of whom are as yet unsophisticated in 
relation to cybersecurity. This can be achieved in ways that emphasize the totality of the threat and the 
personal responsibility of each user to contribute to a cybersecurity survival strategy that protects self and 
community members from cybercrime. For the purposes of wider community engagement and educa-
tion, archaeological frameworks explicate the hostile digital environment to which people must now 
adapt. The threats are invisible, the vulnerabilities unrecognized, the harms unperceived and potentially 
catastrophic. The prism of archaeology elucidates the spectrum of cybercrime, so illuminating this risky 
environment, highlighting the necessity for and significance of viewing engagement with the digital 
environment from the perspective of a cybersecurity ecosystem (a philosophical foundation under-
pinning policy and practice). It also promotes well-being, safety and survival, providing a practical 
philosophy to juxtapose the work of moral philosophers contemplating how individuals can live 
a digital life worth living (Vallor 2016).
Finally, in contributing meaningfully to a philosophy of cybersecurity which explains and emphasizes 
the important role of ordinary users, as well as those technically-sophisticated, in sustaining a safe digital 
environment, archaeology draws out the important imbalance, evident in public and media representa-
tions of cybercrime between state-initiated cyberwarfare/hacking and the great majority of cybercrime. 
The former may be newsworthy (and important, in that this too affects everybody) but it doesn’t account 
for most people’s direct experience which more typically comprises scams and digital theft, social 
engineering and stalking, IP piracy and streamed sexual/physical abuse.
The Australia National University [ANU] data breach of November 2018
To date (December 2020), no other organization that has been subject of a data breach has been so 
candid and forthcoming in its public discussion of what went wrong and why. This is the only 
publicly accessible detailed case study we have of a data breach (ANU 2019).
What is particularly interesting about the ANU report is that it adopts an ‘environmental’ perspective in 
its analysis, as an archaeologist would seek to understand an artefact or a monument in its wider context. 
Thus, Stonehenge can be studied as a monument to learn about Neolithic masonry and construction 
practices, but the monument itself only makes sense, only acquires meaning for the modern audience, 
when viewed within its landscape. So, too, with this data breach example.
Rather than just limit themselves to understanding the technical means by which the hostile 
actor(s) gained access to ANU systems and data – the digital locks and bolts and how these worked 
or failed – ANU’s analysis adopted an environment perspective that incorporated ‘people and 
process issues’ as well, concluding that this was ‘an organizational issue’ rather than an IT security 
issue, and that a key resolution strategy was the need to emphasize ‘culture and security awareness 
among students, staff and researchers’ (ANU 2019, 3).
One (non-)process that had significant implications was the failure to disconnect from the network, 
and dispose of in a timely fashion, decommissioned and disused digital hardware such as old desk-top 
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computers. This assemblage provided the hostile actor(s) with a virtual landscape of vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited to help disguise the presence and purpose of the intruder(s).
The analysis undertaken by ANU focused on what might be termed the occupational debris left 
by the intruder(s), which often comprised negative features such as the digital equivalent of a ditch 
cut, the wiping of event and systems logs to deny investigators evidence of precisely which data had 
been compromised, copied, and exfiltrated. The ‘occupational debris’ also provided evidence that 
‘the actor’s dwell time on the ANU network was approximately six weeks’ (ANU 2019, 2).
Piecing together the steps taken by the actor(s) – and how these related to what was or was not 
happening in the authorized user community and intrusion-detection systems – was not dissimilar 
to comprehending context chronology and relationships using a Harris Matrix.
Working in the cybersecurity arena, the lesson from this incident is the message it contains for 
technically-focussed colleagues about the need to view cybersecurity as an environmental system, as an 
archaeologist would view a site in the landscape, not simply as different types of digital locks and bolts. 
As much as anything, we argue that cybersecurity needs to adopt an archaeological way of thinking.
In terms of the cyber-harms we catalogue, the ANU data breach caused harms 1, 2 and 3 – and we 
do not yet know whether it has given rise to harms 4 and 5, but that possibility has prompted ANU 
to engage in constant surveillance to detect these harms as soon as they happen.
In terms of the new materiality, the ANU breach utilized all four categories, in multiple locations: 
the hostile actor(s) used their own hardware and internet access, as well as routing the attacks 
through disguised vectors and accessing the hardware and networks at ANU.
And the data breach featured all three categories of cybercrime digital artefact that we identify: 
Intruder-designed bespoke malware was used to compromise the ANU networks and data once 
systems access had been achieved through the phishing attacks (Category 1); standard email 
software was used to conduct social engineering attacks via phishing attacks (Category 2); and 
the exfiltration of data would enable the hostile actor(s) to create data-sets of copied personal 
identifiable information [PII] that become a criminal asset in and of themselves, and could be used to 
commit various other physical and digital crimes (Category 3).
Conclusion
Our archaeological framing of cybercrime builds on Perry and Morgan’s (2015, 96)
promise of an ‘archaeological media archaeology’, wherein the process of enquiry and interpretative 
outcomes trigger critical examination of both fields of practice, and heighten our capacity to think 
meaningfully about the past, present, and future.
We argue that archaeological techniques can ‘bring a broad discussion of technology into focus 
through materiality’ (Perry and Morgan 2015, 97), building on their citation of Buchli and Lucas 
(2001, 9) in translating ‘an everyday perceptual language into an archaeological one’.
Archaeology provides distinct and helpful contributions to some wicked problems, many of 
which will only grow in scale and complexity over time, perhaps exponentially in the case of 
cybercrime. In characterizing the challenge for cybersecurity (admittedly with its focus more on 
states than individuals), Follis and Fish (2020, 204–5) suggest that,
rather than surrender to a bleak vision of a technologically determined and dystopic future, our best 
strategy is to think the future in the present. That is, we need to think seriously about how to support and 
develop mechanisms of algorithmic justice; about how the legal, criminal, and ethical systems we have 
come to rely on will govern human and nonhuman interactions; and how to narrow the gap between our 
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rapid adoption of new technologies and our slow and imperfect understanding of how these technol-
ogies are reshaping the human condition. (our emphasis)
Above all, the digitally-connected community needs to think seriously about how to help individuals 
understand and survive safely the digital environment they now (often unwittingly) inhabit. People 
need to better understand how to protect themselves – and so others – from the invisible dangers of 
malware and the insidious dangers of misinformation.
These are all challenges that can be viewed from an archaeological perspective that foregrounds 
human adaptation through its (im)material manifestations. By taking an archaeological approach to 
something as ubiquitous and as dangerous as cybercrime, we are proposing to follow Follis and 
Fish’s suggestion to ‘think the future in the present’. We qualify this, however, by promoting the 
direct use of methods and perspectives developed to investigate the past, notably the complex 
(including both spatial and stratigraphic) relationships between people and things and the ever- 
changing landscape in which they co-exist. In other words we suggest that, as a novel approach to 
the wicked problem of cybercrime and in developing a philosophy of cybersecurity, that we might 
helpfully think the future through the past and, in Holtorf and Hogberg’s terms (2014, 351), use this 
aspect of ‘cultural heritage for the benefit of society in the future’.
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